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COMMENTS
PROTECTION FOR CITIZEN COMPLAINTS TO
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES-PROHIBITION OF
RETALIATORY EVICTIONS:
THE CASE OF EDWARDS v. HABIB
Edwards v. Habib is a recent decision from the United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit which allows tenants
in month-to-month tenancies a defense against summary dispossess
actions.' Where the tenant had complained to local authorities that
his dwelling did not meet the minimal housing standards in that
jurisdiction, a landlord had been able to punish the complaining
tenant through eviction.2 The tenant in the District of Columbia
after Edwards is now permitted to assert as a defense to eviction
the illegal retaliatory purpose of the landlord.3 The decision is an
1 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690, 702, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 89 S. Ct. 618 (1969). For additional comment on the Edwards
case see, Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3
HAmv. Civ. RiGHTs-Crv. LIB. L. REV. 193 (1967); Note, Retaliatory
Eviction-Is California Lagging Behind? 18 HAST. L. J. 710 (1967);
Note, Retaliatory Evictions and the Reporting of Housing Code Viola-
tions in the District of Columbia, 36 GRO. WASH. L. REV. 190 (1967);
Comment, Landlord-Tenant-Eviction in Retaliation for Reporting
Housing Code Violations Prohibited, 44 NOTRE DAwv LAWYER 286
(1968); Note, Landlord and Tenant-Eviction-Public Policy and
Congressional Purpose to Ensure Decent Housing Conditions Require
Construction of Summary Eviction Statute to Prohibit Eviction in
Retaliation for Tenant's Reports of Housing Code Violations to Author-
ities, 82 -ARv. L. REV. 932 (1969).
Judge J. Skelly Wright, who wrote the opinion for the court in
the Court of Appeals, has also written an interesting subsequent article
in which he mentioned the Edwards opinion and concludes that: "The
fact that this is a landmark case shows that the courts have preyed
on the poor. Until now the courts in every jurisdiction have not
merely refused to intercede to halt retaliatory evictions, but have
actually placed their imprimaturs on such evictions by enforcing
them." Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times, March
9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine) at 26, 108, 110 [hereinafter cited as Wright].
2 Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change,
54 GEo. L.J. 519, 541, 542 (1966). The common law rule that a land-
lord may demand possession after reasonable notice continues to be
followed. 2 WALSH, ComSmNTAmEs ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
145-67 (1947). The demand for possession both in the District of
Columbia and in other jurisdictions is frequently used as a retaliation
against a tenant who has complained of code violations on the rented
premises. See e.g., Gibbons, Landlord-Tenant Problems in LEGAL
REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR-A GUIDE FOR NEw JERSEY'S LEGAL
SERVICES PROJECT ATTORNEYS 275, 295, 296 (E. Jarmel ed. 1968) [here-
inafter cited as LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR].
8 397 F.2d at 690.
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important judicial attempt to bring landlord-tenant law into con-
formity with the reality of a continuing domestic-housing shortage
and the necessity to enforce municipal housing codes.4
Edwards v. Habib was decided in a jurisdiction in which housing
problems are among the most serious in the nation. Yet the inade-
quacy of housing for the poor in the District of Columbia is only a
small part of the continuing national crisis in urban housing. De-
spite the fact that these housing problems have been widely reported
in recent years, efforts to meet them have been inadequate.6 Statis-
tics continue to demonstrate a quantitative need for additional units
and for renovation of existing units.7 Statistics cannot, however,
begin to indicate the effects that housing conditions have on the
lives of individuals who are forced to live in overcrowded and
substandard housing units.8
Since there has not been an adequate program to build new
housing units for the poor, the present inadequate supply must be
rehabilitated 9 The basic instrument in this rehabilitation has been
4 See Comment, Tenants' Remedies in the District of Columbia: New
Hope for Reform, 18 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 80 (1968); and Comment,
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-
Civ. LIB. L. REv. 193 (1967).
5 Hearings on S. 2331, 3549, and 3558 Before the Subcommitt. on Busi-
ness and Commerce of the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, 3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings];
Schoshinski, supra note 2, at 519; NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COM-
MISSION, PROBLEMS OF HOUs NG PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (1966)
(excerpts reprinted in 1966 Hearings 406-13); 397 F.2d at 701. It
was estimated that 37.3 percent of the District of Columbia's total
household population were deprived of sound uncrowded housing at
rentals reasonable in comparison with income. 1966 Hearings 192.
6 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIV DISORDERS
257 (March 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS]:
"[S]ince 1960... [t]here has been virtually no decline in the num-
ber of occupied dilapidated units in metropolitan areas, and surveys in
New York City and Watts actually show an increase in the number
of such units. These statistics have led the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to conclude that while the trend in the country
as a whole is toward less substandard housing, 'There are individual
neighborhoods and areas within many cities where the housing situa-
tion continues to deteriorate.'"
7 Id.
8Sax and Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 869 (1967);
M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) and Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
371 (1959), cited in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 n.47; Presi-
dent Johnson's message to Congress on the District of Columbia,
February 15, 1965, reprinted in 1966 Hearings 17-18.
9 Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Reme-
dies, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1254, 1255 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gribetz
and Grad]; LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR at 278.
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the housing code which sets minimum dwelling standards' 0 Since
codes are less expensive and politically more feasible than large-
scale building programs, more cities and municipalities continue to
adopt them."
Unfortunately, where codes have been adopted, they have not
been uniformly and effectively enforced. 2 Code enforcement has
been retarded by the fact that often more than one agency is
involved, and the overlapping agency jurisdiction has resulted in
inefficiency.'5 In most cases the staff size assigned to inspection
has been inadequate, and the budgetary limitations have precluded
hiring of well-trained personnel.' 4
10 "The fundamental instrument in this effort is the housing code with
its specific standards of maintenance. Such regulation is necessary
because the common law imposed almost no sanction on the landlord
for failure to repair and maintain the property." LEGAL REPRESENTA-
TION OF THE POOR at 277.
" Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (1956).
The Housing Act of 1954 appears to have been the major impetus in
encouraging cities to adopt housing codes. Note, Enforcement of Muni-
cipal Housing Codes, 78 HAv. L. REV. 801 (1965). Since 1954 more than
650 cities have adopted housing codes. Id. It has been estimated by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development that as of June
30, 1965, there were over 1,000 housing codes in effect. (An unofficial
survey quoted by the Neighborhood Legal Services Project of the
United Planning Organization in the District of Columbia in 1966
Hearings 38 n.3). Currently, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development has the power to encourage the adoption and effective
enforcement of such codes. Grants of federal funds have been auth-
orized, "to cities, other municipalities, and counties for the purpose
of assisting such localities in carrying out programs of concentrated
code enforcement in deteriorated or deteriorating areas in which
such enforcement, together with those public improvements to be
provided by the locality, may be expected to arrest the decline of the
area." Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 311(a), 42
U.S.C. § 1468 (1964 ed., Supp. I). For a relatively early discussion of
the purpose and importance of codes see HOUSING AND HoiM FmAxCE
AGENcY, OFFICE OF THE ADVINISTRATOR, DMSION OF HousING REsEARcH,
LocAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF HousiNG CODES (1953).
12 Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 11, at 801.
"The enforcement of housing codes--of minimal standards of health
and safety, fire protection, sanitation, light and ventilation, cleanliness,
maintenance, and occupancy-through inspection, posting of viola-
tions, administrative devices, and, ultimately, legal remedies and
sanctions, has failed in recent years to halt or reverse urban blight."
Gribetz and Grad, supra note 9, at 1255-56.
13 LEGAL RFPRESENTATION OF THE POOR at 292-93; Note, Enforcement of
Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 11, at 804.
14 Inspection teams are usually understaffed and discover only a small
percentage of existing violations. Note, Municipal Housing Codes, supra
note 11, at 1123; see also, Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, supra note 11, at 804; Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract
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With limited personnel, the most effective mode of code en-
forcement-through area-wide searches-becomes less feasible.15
Area-wide searches which are mounted are cursory and infrequent.
For this reason many municipalities rely almost exclusively on
Theory--Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code, 56 GEO. L.J.
920, 929 (1968). There have been various other serious difficulties with
code enforcement and there is no intent here to suggest that an in-
creasing volume of citizen complaints, which Edwards protects, would
provide the only needed element for success in code enforcement.
Even when inspections have disclosed law violations, there have
been problems in treatment of the law violating landlord. Mere dis-
covery of the violation has not meant that the premises will be re-
paired to minimum code requirements. REPORT ON CIVIL DisoRDERs at
472; Gribetz and Grad, supra note 9, at 1277-79. There has been an
inability or an unwillingness to distinguish between an offender with
a few violations and a so-called "hard core" offender or "slum lord."
Gribetz and Grad, supra note 9, at 1276-80.
Judges appear reluctant to treat the latter as criminals and the
assessment of fines has been far below that provided for in the criminal
laws. Id. 1276-77. Small fines are not a significant enough inducement
for owners to make major repairs. LEGAL REPRESENTATioN OF THE POOR
294-95; Note, Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 11, at 1123. The
lack of success of code enforcement is arributable in "great measure"
to the failure of sanctions to induce compliance. Gribetz and Grad,
supra note 9, at 1256. Delays and adjournment of prosecutions against
the landlords are common. Id. at 1277-79. The average wait for cases
examined by the building department in New York was five months
while grace periods and extensions in the District of Columbia some-
times delay repairs as long as a year and a half. Although there is
a possibility of a sentence of 10 days in jail and a fine of $300 in the
District of Columbia, apparently there are no cases where the land-
lord has spent even one day in jail. Wright, supra note 1, at 108.
An additional problem is the collusion or atmosphere of friendly
sympathy which frequently exists between the landlord and the hous-
ing inspector. 1966 Hearings 107. This has been an especially grave
problem in the District of Columbia, but it appears to exist in a
number of other jurisdictions as well. 1966 Hearings 19.
The potentially far-reaching case of People v. Walker, 50 Misc. 2d
751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1966) illustrates the problem of cor-
ruption within the Department of Inspections in New York City. In
that case it was held that after a landlord had exposed corruption
within the Department an inspection with possible retaliatory motive
was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause. Where
there was official retaliation through selective enforcement of the
housing codes, there was a denial of equal protection.
15 See Comment, Camara and See: Accommodation Between the Right
of Privacy and the Public Need, 47 NEB. L. REv. 613, 624 (1968). In
the Camara decision the majority opinion noted: "There is unani-
mous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the
only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum
standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic
inspections of all structures. ... " Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 535, 536 (1967). A study in New York City in 1953 illustrated
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citizen complaints.16 Ideally, if tenants were aware of the existence
of codes and had confidence in their enforcement, tenant com-
plaints would be an important source of information.17 Even if
thorough and frequent area-wide searches were possible, tenant
complaints would still be an important supplementary source of
information.' 8 An effective complaint procedure would permit
tenants to involve themselves in altering illegal housing conditions. 19
When a landlord can evict a tenant because he has complained
to the authorities about illegal conditions, tenants will be deterred
from making complaints.20 In an urban area with a housing short-
the potential thoroughness of the area-wide search as opposed to the
citizen-complaint process: "[I]n 1953 in New York City, an inspection
team went through a 15-square block area as to which 567 violations
had been reported by the complaint procedure. The survey revealed a
total of 12,445 violations." LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR at 293.
While there appears to be various problems with area-wide code
enforcement, the Camara and See cases appear not to be unduly
restrictive of this technique. See Comment, Camara and See: Accom-
modation Between the Right of Privacy and the Public Need, supra
at 622.
16 LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR at 295.
1 Id.
M Id; See also Gribetz and Grad, supra note 9, at 1258; Note, Enforce-
ment of Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 11, at 843-60; Sax and
Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, supra note 8, at 843-860, 65 MicH.
L. REV. 869. "Effective implementation and enforcement of the codes
obviously depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of
violations." 397 F.2d at 700.
The discussion here is limited to private landlord-tenant relations
with regard to code enforcement not only because this was the
factual situation presented in the Edwards case but also because the
great majority of low income families are tenants. LEGAL REPRESENTA-
TiON OF THE POOR at 275.
19 For a good example of an attempt in the District of Columbia to
involve tenants in making complaints see THE UNITED PLANNING OR-
GANiZATION, THE STAND Up AND FGHT Boo.
20 See excerpt from President Johnson's Message to Congress on the
District of Columbia, 2 LAw 3N ACTION 1, 6 (March, 1968).
The discussion herein is limited to a discussion of landlord retalia-
tion for a tenant's report of substandard housing conditions. Eviction
may currently be used in retaliation for any other acts of the tenant,
and it appears to be a significant factor in discouraging the main-
tenance of suits against the landlord. See Note, Leases and the Ille-
gal Contract Theory-Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code,
56 GEO. L.J. 920 (1968).
An interesting example of the power which landlords wield in
the District was presented by the eviction of Mrs. Elicia Powell after
her house in the slum area was toured by Senator Tydings. Various
violations of the housing code were noted during the tour of Mrs.
Powell's house and the violations were mentioned in an article which
appeared in the Washington Post on June 16, 1966. Although Mrs.
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age, the threat of eviction is an overwhelming weapon which the
landlord can wield2 ' because: (1) the vacancy rate in most cities
is very low thus making it difficult to find a new residence; 22 (2)
even if a new residence is found, it may well be as undesirable or
even less desirable than the old residence;23 (3) public housing is
usually not a reasonable alternative because it is in short supply
and not immediately available to evicted tenants;24 (4) the avail-
ability of other housing may be further reduced because the tenant
may be marked as a trouble-maker and landlords may therefore
exclude him;25 (5) the expense of moving for low income tenants
is often a formidable one;26 and (6) the usual suddenness of the
eviction is coupled with the loss of familiar surroundings and a
feeling of both helplessness and injustice.
2 7
Powell's name was not mentioned in the article, the block on which
she lived was identified and the amount she paid for rent was dis-
closed. On June 27th Mrs. Powell was served with a 30-day notice
to vacate her house. 1966 Hearings 146.
Apparently Senator Tydings, through scheduling an appearance
and questioning the landlord before the Subcommittee on Business
and Commerce, was able to convince the landlord that Mrs. Powell
should remain in the tenancy. 1966 Hearings 214.
21 See, e.g., The statement of Harris Weinstein, Chairman, Housing
Committee, Washington Planning and Housing Association in 1966
Hearings: "Housing regulations, housing codes, statutes, and laws
of any manner are of no avail if the party to be benefited by the law
is too intimidated to invoke his rights. Many tenants of low income
in this city are afraid to complain against their landlord no matter
how egregious may be the landlord's disregard of law. This fear is
real; it is abiding; it is frequently a complete inhibition upon the
tenant who would prefer to abate the squalor in which he lives.
A vast number of tenants in this city believe that if they complain
against their landlord, the landlord will immediately retaliate through
an eviction or exorbitant rent increase.
[T]his fear is not mere superstittion. It is based on experience and
represents a fear of what would, in fact, happen to many tenants if
they complained." Id. at 64.
22 Mr. Habib testified that the vacancy rate in Washington, D.C. was
1.7% and was the lowest in the United States. 1966 Hearings 167. It
is not a meaningful remedy to tell a tenant to move elsewhere in a
eity with an acute housing shortage. Brief of Washington, D.C. Neigh-
borhood Legal Services representing appellant in Brown v. Southall
Realty Company, 237 A.2d 834 (1968) at 20.
23 See note 6 supra.
24 Gribetz and Grad, supra note 9, at 1255.
25 Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of
'Undesirables' from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE L.J. 988, 990
(1968).
25 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27 Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants, supra note 25, at 990.
COAMENTS
An exemplary eviction of a complaining tenant will frequently
silence other tenants who fear to lose what housing accommoda-
tions they have.28 Until Edwards v. Habib such an eviction was a
swift and certain means of retribution against any tenant in a
month-to-month tenancy.Y For those tenants there was no defense
to an eviction action.
LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS IN EDWARDS v. HABIB
In 1965, Mrs. Yvonne Edwards, a month-to-month tenant in the
District of Columbia, made complaints concerning code violations
to the Department of Licenses and Inspections of the District of
Columbia.8" The Housing Division had the premises inspected,
discovered more than forty violations of the housing code, and
ordered the landlord to make the necessary repairs. 1 After Mr.
Habib, the landlord, was notified of the repairs and improvements
which had to be made, he sought to have Mrs. Edwards evicted.8
2
Pursuant to the District of Columbia Code section 45-902, Mr.
Habib gave Mrs. Edwards thirty days notice to quit the premises.
3 3
In Habib v. Edwards, Mr. Habib obtained a default judgment for
28 See Judge Wright's opinion, 397 F.2d at 701: "Hence an eviction under
the circumstances of this case would not only punish appellant for
making a complaint which she had a constitutional right to make...
but also would stand as a warning to others that they dare not be
so bold, a result which, from the authorization of the housing code,
we think Congress affirmatively sought to avoid." See also LEGAL
REPRESENTATiON OF THE POOR at 295-96: "Such an eviction has the
effect of serving as an example to other tenants by demonstrating
to them the severe personal consequences of making complaints to
the housing inspectors. By intimidating the other tenants in the build-
ing and the neighborhood this tends to dry up a source of complaints
upon which the inspectors rely in carrying out their job."
29 Schoshinski, supra note 2, at 545.
30 See Note, Retaliatory Eviction-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18
HAsTINGs L. J. 700 (1967); Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388, 389 (1967).
31 397 F.2d at 688.
32 Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965); N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF
LAW PROJECT ON SocIAL WELFARE LAW, HOusING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS
AwD REMEDIES, No. 1 at 42 (1967) [hereinafter cited as HOusING FOR
THE POOR]. Mr. Habib was the executive vice president of the Wash-
ington Homeowners and Property Owners Association. He owned
approximately three hundred units worth over one million dollars
in the District of Columbia alone. 1966 Hearings 164-96.
33 D.C. CODE § 45-902 (1967), Notices to quit-Month to Month: "A
tenancy from month to month, or from quarter to quarter, may be
terminated by a thirty days' notice in writing from the landlord to
the tenant to quit, or by such a notice from the tenant to the land-
lord of his intention to quit, said notice to expire, in either case, on
the day of the month from which such tenancy commenced to run."
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possession.3 4 The motion to set aside the default judgment was
granted by Judge Greene in a significant memorandum opinion.35
However, at the subsequent trial, the judge ruled that retaliatory
34 Habib v. Edwards, Civil Action No. LT 75895--'65 (D.C. Gen. Sess.
Landlord-Tenant Branch, Oct. 11, 1965). The default judgment was
obtained in the Landlord-Tenant Branch of the General Sessions
Court under D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-910. HOUSING FOR THE POOR 42.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 910 (1967), Ejectment or summary proceedings:
"[W]henever a lease for any definite term shall expire, or any tenancy
shall be terminated by notice as aforesaid, and the tenant shall fail
or refuse to surrender possession of the leased premises, the landlord
may bring an action of ejectment to recover possession in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia; or the landlord
may bring an action to recover possession before the District of
Columbia Court of General Sessions, as provided in sections 11-701
to 11-749."
35 Habib v. Edwards, Civil Action No. LT 75895--'65 (D.C. Gen. Sess.
Landlord-Tenant Branch, Oct. 27, 1965), reprinted in HOUSING FOR
THE POOR at 43 and 1966 Hearings 172.
The motion was granted by Judge Harold Greene who held, in
a memorandum opinion, that the default judgment should be set
aside because excusable neglect had been shown.
In the most significant portion of the opinion, Judge Greene noted
that Section 910 (supra note 34) was subject to and limited by the
Constitution. He cited Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (1955) in
which possession under Section 910 was denied on constitutional
grounds, and he concluded that "the principle of constitutional su-
premacy in possession suits recognized by that decision obviously
applies to everyone." HoUSING FOR THE POOR at 45-46.
Judge Greene resisted the argument made by counsel for Mrs.
Edwards that her right to free speech and to petition the government
for redress of grievances were denied by the landlord (in his serving
of the notice to quit) and the government (in its permitting the land-
lord to terminate the tenancy by such notice and in judicially enforc-
ing the notice). Id. at 46-48. He wrote that, while the first amendment
applied to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, neither
the first nor the fourteenth amendment is applicable to "purely pri-
vate acts of private parties." Id. at 46.
Yet Judge Greene found that Mrs. Edwards had been denied
another constitutional right: "If the testimony of the defendant is true,
she is being evicted because she gave infomation to her government
concerning a violation of these laws and regulations... defendant has
a constitutional right to provide such information to the government.
Moreover, that right-unlike the right encompassed within the First
and Fourteenth Amendments-is protected not only against inter-
ference by the government but also against interference by private
persons." Id. at 48.
Judge Greene relied upon In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) in
holding that Mrs. Edwards had been denied the right to inform
authorities of violations of the law-a right which was not grounded
in a particular amendment but which arose out of the creation and
establishment by the Constitution of a supreme national government.
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eviction was not a defense and ordered a directed verdict for the
landlordV6
While an appeal was pending before the District of Columbia
Municipal Court of Appeals, the tenant sought a stay of execution
from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. That court allowed the stay in a brief per curiam decision, but
the concurring opinion of Judge Wright and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Danaher indicated the court's strong division on the issues
presented in the case.
3 7
On appeal the trial court's directed verdict for the landlord was
upheld,38 and the case was appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION IN EDWARDS v. HABIB
(a) DIsPosITIoN ON THE GRouNDs OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND PUBLic POLICY
The majority opinion in the United States Court of Appeals
written by Judge Wright with Judge McGowan concurring, held
that a tenant had a defense to an action of eviction if the tenant
could prove that the landlord was evicting because the tenant had
reported housing code violations 39 The case was remanded for a
new trial in which Mrs. Edwards could attempt to prove Mr. Habib's
retaliatory intent.
40
Judge Wright's majority opinion and Judge McGowan's con-
curring opinion were based on an interpretation of the District
of Columbia summary eviction code sections and the District's
housing code.41 A landlord could not, the majority opinion held,
use summary eviction procedures to punish and deter the reporting
of housing code violations.4 Such an eviction could not be per-
mitted as a matter of statutory construction and for reasons of
public policy.43
The majority proceeded on the assumption that permitting
retaliatory evictions would deter citizen complaints of housing
code violations and that such citizen complaints were an important
36 See, Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388, 389 (1967); HOUSING FOR THE
PooR at 42.
37 Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
38 Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (1967).
39 397 F.2d at 690.
40 Id. at 702-03.
41 Id. at 690, 699, 701.
42 Id. at 699.
43 Id. at 699.
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part of the effective implementation and enforcement of the codes.
44
If that were true, then the use of the summary eviction statutes
for an "illegal purpose" (to render ineffective the housing code
and punish those who reported law violations) could not be
countenanced by the court nor could it have been intended by
Congress. This, the court noted, was especially true since the
eviction statute was merely "procedural. ' 45 On the other hand,
the housing code embodied a "strong and pervasive congressional
concern to secure for the city's slum dwellers decent, or at least
safe and sanitary places to live. '46 With this purpose statutorily
expressed in the housing codes, 47 the court concluded that Congress
44 Id. at 700.
45 Id. at 699.
46 Id. at 700.
47 Congress authorized the Commissioners of the District of Columbia
to enact building regulations: "The Commissioners of the District of
Columbia are authorized and directed to make and enforce such build-
ing regulations for the said District as they may deem advisable."
"Such rules and regulations made as above provided shall have
the same force and effect within the District of Columbia as if enacted
by Congress." 1 D.C. CoDE § 228 (1967).
For an early Congressional expression of concern in the eradica-
tion of slums and the protection of low income families, see Act of
Sept. 1, 1937, c. 896 § 1, 50 Stat. 888: 'It is hereby reclared to be
the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the
Nation by employing its funds and credit,... to remedy the unsafe
and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income... that are
injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of the
Nation."
The purpose of the District of Columbia housing regulations was
expressed in § 2101: "The Commissioners of the District of Columbia
hereby find and declare that there exist residential buildings and areas
within said District which are slums or are otherwise blighted, and
that there are, in addition, other such buildings and areas within
said District which are deteriorating and are in danger of becoming
slums or otherwise blighted unless action is taken to prevent their
further deterioration and decline.
The Commissioners further find and declare that such unfortunate
conditions are due, among other circumstances, to certain conditions
affecting such residential buildings and such areas, among them the
following: dilapidation, inadequate maintenance, overcrowding, inade-
quate toilet facilities, inadequate heating, inadequate bathing or
washing facilities, insufficient protection against fire hazards, inade-
quate lighting and ventilation, and other insanitary or unsafe
conditions.
The Commissioners further find and declare that the aforesaid
conditions, where they exist, and other conditions which contribute
to or cause the deterioration of residential buildings and areas, are
deleterious to the health, safety, welfare and morals of the community
and its inhabitants. Congress has made statements of policy which
are similar.
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affirmatively sought to avoid the use of the summary eviction
statute to deter individuals from reporting housing code violations. 48
The majority opinion concludes that a violation of the policy
embodied in the housing codes is illegal.49 Hence, while the sum-
mary eviction statute can be used for any reason or no reason at all,
the court circumvents this statute's language by holding that it may
not be used to accomplish an illegal purpose. Yet such an eviction
does not violate the terms of the housing code-although the major-
ity states that a "[piresumption against the legality of such
intimidation can be inferred as inherent in the legislation even if
it is not expressed in the statute itself ... 2 50 Even the citizen
complaint, which the court is seeking to preserve, is not formally
provided for in the housing code.51
The Edwards opinion defines illegality in terms of public policy.
The difficulty is that there is a competing "fundamental" public
policy, as Judge Danaher notes, which militates for the landlord's
right to control his property.52 While it is true that the public
policy of the housing code is statutorily expressed, the expression
is so generalized that it does not directly resolve the statutory
conflict in the Edwards case.
3
It is hereby declared to be a matter of legislative determination
that owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out,
and other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use
of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injur-
ious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare, and it is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote
the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by
eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all means
necessary and appropriate for the purpose." D.C. CODE Ai. § 5-701
(1961).
49 397 F.2d at 701.
49 Id. at 699-702.
50 Id. at 701-02.
51 Id. at 700. The court nevertheless noted that the Department of
Licenses and Inspections had established its own procedure for han-
dling citizen complaints and that for fiscal 1966 nearly a third of the
cases handled by the Department arose from private complaints. Id.
52 Judge Danaher's argument in the dissent was less concerned with the
precise rights which the landlord possessed than with the absence of
authority in the courts to change landlord-tenant relationships. Id. at
703-704. His dissent nevertheless touched on the "fundamental" rule
of law which allows evictions, and argued, in effect, that the court's
denial of property control to the landlord was a taking of property
without due process. Id. at 703.
53 The code does not speak directly to the issue of retaliatory evictions,
and, as Judge Danaher noted in the dissent, legislation has been pro-
posed to remedy the problem of retaliation. Id. at 704. The court
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The court might have been more convincing if it had simply
admitted that there were competing rights involved in Edwards.
54
The court admitted that there might be countervailing consider-
ations when it discussed the constitutional issues involved in the
decision. 55 Yet the court's resolution of the issue of statutory
interpretation was accomplished with no real discussion of the
landlord's right to his property and the policy, to the extent
there is any, behind the common law rule permitting the landlord
possession for any reason after notice has been given. This common
law rule was changed in Edwards, but to say that the code's general
expression of purpose effected this change or that a prohibition on
retaliatory eviction should be read into the code is difficult to accept.
Of course the adoption of the housing codes had impact upon
the landlord-state relationship and upon the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. But the doctrine which Edwards announces is that the
codes altered the periodic tenancy so that the tenant may remain
in his tenancy even after notice if the landlord's motive in the
eviction violates the policy behind the housing codes."" In the
recognized that neither the summary eviction statutes nor the housing
code contemplated the specific problem of retaliatory evictions. Id. at
702 n.50. See generally 82 HARv. L. REV. 932 (1969), supra note 1, at
933-35.
54 Instead of labeling the summary eviction statute as merely "proce-
dural" and contending that there was therefore no statutory conflict
between that statute and the housing code, the court might have noted
that the summary eviction statute expresses the older common law
policy favoring the landlord and discussed the extent to which that
had been altered by the adoption of the housing codes.
55 Yet the court did not define what the landlord's rights and interests
were. 397 F.2d at 695.
56 Id. at 701-702. It is clear that other jurisdictions will need consider-
able persuasion before they abandon their time-honored summary
eviction statutes in the face of clear-cut retaliatory evictions.
After the Edwards decision, the defense of retaliatory eviction was
held not to be available to tenants in Connecticut in LaChance v. Hoyt,
CV 14-685-35851, a decision by the Circuit Court of the Fourteenth
Circuit on September 6, 1968. In that case the tenant had informed
the Bureau of Housing Code Enforcement of Hartford about viola-
tions in his apartment. After an examination of the premises some
of the complaints were substantiated and a letter was sent to the land-
lord listing things to be done. On the day the landlord received the
letter from the Bureau she called her attorney to institute eviction
proceedings.
In the eviction proceedings the tenant was represented by counsel
from the Hartford Legal Aid Society. The Attorney General of Con-
necticut filed a Motion to Intervene as Party Defendant to protect
three different interests: (1) to assure that proper use is made of
state courts; (2) to prevent threatened emasculation of certain sta-
tutes (including building and sanitary ordinances); (3) to protect
citizens of the state against a deprivation of first and fourth amend-
COMMENTS
absence of a specific housing code provision or a demonstration
of legislative intent which called for or permitted this alteration
of the periodic tenancy, the court's holding based upon statutory
interpretation and public policy becomes less plausible.
The court argues that Congress "by directing the enactment of
the housing code, inpliedly directed the court to prefer the interests
of the tenant who seeks to avail himself of the code's protection.
57
Leaving aside the question of whether this was actually con-
gressional intent, this statement surely cannot stand without some
explanation of what rights the landlord has which are now in a less
preferred position.68 Apparently this "pervasive policy" of the
housing codes may now be used by the tenant to overcome certain
contractual rights of the landlord as well as statutes which clearly
militate in his favor. There must be a stopping place for such a
policy, and it is this which the court should have taken greater
pains to explain.
ment rights and against the affects of summary eviction process unrea-
sonably used.
The issue was the same as in the Habib case: "The question to
be answered now is whether or not a defense of 'retaliatory action'
can be considered in summary process matters and whether or not
the eviction proceedings in this matter was a retaliatory action."
(advance sheet opinion at 5).
The court held in favor of the landlord on the sole ground that
retaliatory eviction was not a legislatively permitted defense: "It is
inconceivable to expect that a Judge would usurp the functions of
the legislature; any change in the rights of landlord and tenants
should be undertaken by the legislature; not the courts. The law-
makers deliberate as a group and enact legislation accordingly. The
statute on summary process actions has to be followed closely; the
special defense of 'retaliatory action' has no place or standing under
the statute." (advance sheet 7).
57 397 F.2d at 696.
58 Of course Congress had an intent to better the housing conditions in
the District of Columbia, but whether this can be equated with an
intent consistently to prefer tenant to landlord interests is question-
able. There are a number of compelling reasons why housing codes
should be enacted including the economic interest of the landlord
in maintaining the economic value of his investment. As the Supreme
Court has observed in commenting upon the rationale behind codes
and code enforcement: "Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal
investigation, the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at
securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for
private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to
prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are
hazardous to public health and safety. Because fires and epidemics
may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly conditions adversely
affect the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous courts
have upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce
such minimum standards even upon existing structures." Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
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The Edwards case adopts a deceptively simple rationale based
on statutory construction and public policy grounds which are
strongly, though indirectly, challenged in the dissent. It would
appear that the attempt in Edwards to avoid the constitutional
grounds for decision has not, in the absence of further legislation
by the District of Columbia, been wholly convincing.
(b) THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIscussIoN
Because the holding in Edwards was founded upon statutory
construction, the consideration of constitutional issues was not
"constitutionally compelled."59 Nevertheless, Judge Wright's opin-
ion begins with an extensive discussion of the constitutional issues
in which he appears to conclude that Mrs. Edwards did have
constitutional rights which were violated by a retaliatory eviction.60
It is because of this constitutional discussion that Judge McGowan
59 The court stated that it did not need to consider the constitutional
challenge to the statutes because of its construction of the statute
based upon Congressional intent. The court's reason for considering
the constitutional claims at all was "because the constitutional con-
siderations inform the statutory construction on which our decision
rests, we do discuss them briefly." 397 F.2d at 690. The constitutional
discussion comprises the major portion of Judge Wright's opinion.
The court felt that the "lurking constitutional issues are relevant
to our construction of the statutes in two ways." Id. at 690, n.6. The
first reason why the Constitution was relevant was that its considera-
tion should be avoided: "where two interpretations are plausible, we
should opt for the one that avoids the constitutional questions."Id.
This was a reason why the Constitution was relevant to statutory
construction in general but was not a reason why the constitutional
issues need have been discussed in this case.
Nevertheless, the court's second reason appeared to militate for
the constitutional discussion: "[I]n discerning the intent of Congress
we must assume that it too sought to avoid constitutional doubt and
to protect the constitutional interests which are at stake." Id. Judge
Wright's assumption that Congress sought to protect the constitutional
interests at stake proceeds implicitly on a more basic assumption
that Congress was aware of what those constitutional interests were.
Of course it may always be said that Congress in enacting legislation
seeks to avoid constitutional clash, but that is not quite the same
purpose as seeking to affirm a given constitutional protection via
the legislation, nor can it be deduced that Congress is thereby seeking
to affirm constitutional protections however defined. Judge Wright's
conclusion that Congress sought to protect the constitutional interests
which the petitioner asserts is surely to attribute too much to Con-
gressional intent.
60 Id. at 696 and 698. Note especially Judge Wright's introduction to
the third portion of the opinion in which he appears to assume that
Mrs. Edward had a "constitutional defense" but that "judicial recog-
nition" of it was not compelled. Id. at 699.
COMMENTS
chose to concur with Judge Wright's opinion rather than join in its
"constitutional speculations."61
The two constitutional questions which Judge Wright's opinion
considers are: (1) whether there is a constitutional right to report
violations of law and petition the government for redress of
grievances under the first and fourteenth amendments; and (2)
whether there is a constitutional right to inform the government
of law violations which inheres in the very nature of the Consti-
tution and the federal government and which is protected against
both private and governmental interference.
62
Petitioning the government through reporting of housing code
violations is at the core of protected first amendment speech.63
Eviction for exercise of this right is a form of punishment.6 4 Yet
before an evicted tenant can prevail on first amendment grounds,
he must demonstrate "state action" under the fourteenth amend-
ment.6 5
Judge Wright noted that in Tarver v. G. & C. Construction
Corporation, "state action" was found where the court system was
utilized in the eviction procedure.66 While Judge Wright did not
explicitly reject this reading of the "state action" requirement,
he noted that Judge Greene's lower court opinion in the Edwards
61 Id. at 703.
62 Id. at 690 and 696.
63 Id. at 690.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 691.
66 In Tarver the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York was confronted with a factual situation almost identical
to that in Edwards. .rs. Tarver protested to the Health Department
about a code violation in her apartment. The Health Department
apparently notified the landlord, G. & C. Construction Corp. Ms.
Tarver, the same day that she had made the complaint, received a
hand-delivered letter notifying her that her rent was to be increased
from $35 per week to $150 per week commencing the following week.
The tenants then sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin their
landlord from evicting them or from taking other retaliatory measures.
In granting the injunction the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York almost cursorily noted that there was
the necessary "state action" to bring alleged deprivations of constitu-
tional rights within the fourteenth amendment. The court stated:
"Defendants' contention that, even assuming a violation of Con-
stitutional rights, plaintiffs have failed to show that defendants are
acting under color of State law is untenable. Patently eviction requires
the action of state courts and State judicial officers, acting in their
official capacities, and the action of the State within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment." LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR
at 403.
1115
1116 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 4 (1969)
case had declined to rely upon such an all encompassing reading
of state action "for fear that if every private right were trans-
formed into governmental action by the mere fact of court enforce-
ment of it, the distinction between private and governmental action
would be obliterated."
67
Judge Wright took the position that between the Tarver
interpretation of Shelley and Judge Greene's opinion, there was
a middle position in which "state action" would not encompass
all private rights.68
Judge Wright relied heavily upon commentators who argue
that there may be "state action" when the state does not act
affirmatively to assure equal protection.6 9 The state would thereby
be acting unconstitutionally through inaction except in those
instances where the Constitution demanded inaction. Applying
this view to the Edwards case, Mrs. Edwards' eviction could not
be allowed because the government failed to protect her against
private retaliation for the exercise of her first amendment rights
and because the courts would in fact be assisting the retaliation
by permitting the eviction.
70
A strong objection to this argument of inaction as "state
action" is that it has been urged only in regard to racial dis-
crimination under the fourteenth amendment and not the first
amendment as urged in Edwards.7 1 To meet this objection Judge
Wright cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where the Court
held that first amendment rights were incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Although the Court
in the Times case considered the question of "state action" only
briefly, it concluded that there had been the requisite "state
action" in the application of the state's common law even though
the common law had only formed the doctrine upon which a
private lawsuit was to be litigated.
7 2
Judge Wright cited Marsh v. Alabama "which like the instant
case, involved state aided privately initiated abridgement of first
amendment freedoms. 7 3 In Marsh Justice Black had weighed the
competing constitutional rights of owners of property against those
of people who sought to exercise freedoms of press and of religion.
7 4
67 397 F.2d at 691.
68 Id. at 692.
69 Id. at 692-93.
70 Id. at 693.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 694 n.21.
73 Id. at 695.
74 Id. at 695-96.
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In both the Times and the Marsh cases the state had simply
provided courts and laws to settle essentially private disputes.
In the Times case the state had not initiated the action, and in the
Marsh case there would have been no prosecution if there had not
been a private complaint. Both cases, in Judge Wright's opinion,
stood for the proposition that where the state has provided both
courts and laws and the resolution of the suit violates first amend-
ment rights, as in Edwards, the competing rights must be balanced .7
In the Edwards context Judge Wright asserted that such a balancing
was not necessary because Congress had impliedly directed the
courts to prefer the tenant over the landlord through the adoption
of the housing codes.
76
Judge Wright's opinion also considered whether there is a
right to petition the government and to report violations of law
which is protected against both private and governmental inter-
ference.77 The argument was strongly made in Judge Greene's
lower court opinion where he relied upon In re Quarles to uphold
Mrs. Edwards' constitutional right to inform the authorities of a
law violation without fear of private reprisal.78 Judge Wright also
relied upon In re Quarles and he quoted its holding that:
The right of a citizen informing of a violation of law, like the
right of a prisoner in custody upon a charge of such violation, to
be protected against lawless violence does not depend upon any
of the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of the crea-
tion and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national
government, paramount and supreme within its sphere of action.79
Yet the Quarles argument was not conclusive because at issue
there was the applicability and constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act.80 The Court in Quarles had not been directly faced
with the issue of the constitutionality of such interferences in
the absence of legislation against them or the legal consequences
if such interferences were unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Quarles
cannot be distinguished merely because the Civil Rights Act had
provided statutory protection for certain rights among which was
the right to report violations of the statute.81 The enforcement
75 Id. at 696.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 HousING FOR THE POOR at 51. Judge Greene wrote: "In short, the
defendant in this case has a constitutional right to inform the proper
governmental authorities of violations of the law, as well as the corre-
lative right not to be injured or punished by anyone for having availed
herself of her basic right to provide such information." Id. at 51.
79 In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1895).
80 397 F.2d at 698.
81 Id.
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section of the Civil Rights Act did not add new federal rights but
merely provided sanctions for the violation of existing federal
constitutional and statutory rights.82 The court in Quarles noted
the right to inform the government was a fundamental constitu-
tional right not dependent upon any specific statutory guarantee.8 3
In Edwards the rights which Vfrs. Edwards was asserting were
not protected by a specific statutory guarantee, but they were
protected by the Constitution under the Quarles case. 4
The constitutional discussion in Edwards is an important state-
ment of tenants' rights. Judge Wright's conclusions leave little
doubt that in his opinion Mrs. Edwards could have prevailed upon
her constitutional defenses to the eviction.85 The potential avail-
ability of these constitutional protections to a complaining tenant
may encourage tenants to utilize code complaint procedures.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO RETALIATORY EVICTION
The decision in Edwards v. Habib may prove to be an inadequate
deterrent to retaliatory eviction.8 The case would be extremely
valuable if it could be used to convince landlords that they have
no recourse against code complaints but to repair their units. Yet
landlords of deteriorating or deteriorated units are reluctant to
undertake a full-scale renovation with code standards as their goal.
There would be, landlords argue, little profit motive in such a
renovation and it may even result in operating units at a loss.
8 7
For these reasons, landlords of these dilapidated units will do
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See note 60, supra.
S6 See LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR at 276: "The fundamental
factor in the condition of housing rented to the poor is that, with
the exception of public housing, the buildings are old and their struc-
ture and equipment need continual repair. The circumstances of a
housing shortage, however, considerably reduces the landlord's incen-
tive to invest in repairs. The intensive use due to overcrowding causes
a higher level of physical depreciation of the property. Landlords
tend to give up attempting to repair the building and rely instead on
sefling the property for its land value in some future slum clearance
project. The housing shortage also permits the landlord to maintain
and increase rents despite the deterioration of the premises."
87 See COUNCIL OF ECONoiVric ADvisoRs ANN. REP. 116 (1966), in which
the problems of America's central cities were described as follows:
"The cities became caught in a vicious spiral of spreading slums,
rising crime, and worsening congestion. Once a neighborhood began
to deteriorate, it did not pay any individual landlord to attempt to
stem the decline; private return on new investments fell, since little
extra rent could be charged for better apartments in slum areas."
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everything possible to avoid paying for massive renovation and
continuing repairs.88 If a tenant complains and continues to com-
plain to officials about housing conditions, it would be economically
advantageous for the landlord to remove the tenant from the build-
ing or to raise his rent significantly. The tenant must therefore
convince the landlord that it is not in his economic interest to evict.
It is to meet these cases that legislation could best assist the
tenant. A legislative standard fixing a period of time during which
the landlord could not retaliate would, assuming strict enforcement,
practically eliminate retaliatory eviction as a rational economic
weapon.s9 Of course some landlords would probably still seek to
punish their tenants for complaints, but this punishment would be
expensive in terms of legal costs and probably unsuccessful in
actual litigation.9 0
Yet if retaliatory eviction were eliminated as a rational eco-
nomic weapon, and if codes were properly enforced, many landlords
would find it undesirable if not impossible to seek to maintain
their investments. The cost of repairing the living units to code
standards would, of course, vary depending upon the existing state
of the structure. It is clear, however, that many such structures
could probably not continue to be long-term profitable investments
if code standards were fully enforced.91 In addition, the high
initial cost of making the needed repairs might dissuade a landlord
from making the investment at all. In short, some units would be
89 Mr. Habib, for example, had already been cited for over 1,000 code
violations in 1966 at the time he testified before the Subcommittee on
Business and Commerce. 1966 Hearings at 189.
89 Some of the possible standards are discussed infra.
90 A legislative set of standards which could act as a clear warning
and an active judiciary which would respond to violations of the
legislative standards would appear to be more preferable than a
single commitment by either the legislature or the judiciary which
it may not have the resources to implement.
Both legislative and judicial remedies would increase the probable
cost to a landlord who undertook retaliatory eviction. Legislatively
imposed fines and criminal penalties along with litigation in the
civil courts might convince landlords that the legal costs alone would
be too much to bear. In this regard it might be well to remember
that Mr. Habib's legal costs could only have been borne by an indi-
dual with means somewhat beyond those of the typical landlord. As
Mr. Habib himself observed: "Anyone can appeal who is a tenant
if he has a lawyer, and there are plenty of lawyers who will represent
landlords at no charge." 1966 Hearings at 182. Mr. Habib disclosed that
in 1966 before either of the last two appeals of the case, his lawyers
had spent over 1,000 hours of legal time on the case. Id.
91 DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URBAI DEV. & DEP'T. OF JUSTICE & OFFICE OF
EcoNoAvnc OPPORTUNITY, TENANTS' RIGHTS: LEGAL TOOLS FOR BETTER
HOUSING 26-29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TENANTS' RIGHTS].
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abandoned by the landlords or turned to another use and the
question then would become what happens to the tenants of those
buildings? What role should the state then assume with regard to
them?
92
This question has to some degree been answered by certain
present statutes which allow for the buildings to be put in receiver-
ship.9 3 The state would move into the place of the landlord and
operate the units. Yet if the governmental unit does not make
the conscious decision to move into this area with an awareness of
the possibly significant costs involved, the enforcement of standards
will be relaxed as the city pushes the administration of apartments
from private to public hands. It is better to have a negligent private
landlord than to close the building and further contract the housing
supply.
9 4
The question in the last analysis is a political one. If codes
were adopted because they were politically more expedient than
funding housing programs, will codes be enforced if the cost to
the public is high? If the electorate regards urban renewal as
too expensive, isn't it even less palatable to expend large amounts
of public funds, even comparable amounts of public funds, on
buildings which are older, unattractive, and in continual need of
repair? If the units are not economically profitable for the private
investor, their maintenance may be politically impossible for the
would-be public landlord.
In short, to the extent that codes were a device to avoid making
the difficult political argument for the public funding in part or in
whole of housing units, the codes have failed. To enforce the codes
will require a strenuous political effort to gather the funds for more
inspectors, better-trained inspectors, and, if necessary, public
administration of profitless rental units. Whether it will be best
to provide the needed funds for the code inspection system or to
seek to construct new units is a question which now must be faced
by communities concerned with their housing problems and the
inability of their codes to reduce or ameliorate the hardcore housing
problems. It is to be hoped that the federal government which
has an undeniable interest in the housing problems will take an
active role in inducing each community to make the necessary
decision to fund a program of rehabilitation or construction.95
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., N. Y. MuLTiPLE DwEL.nG LAW § 309 (McKinney 1945),
and Laws of Illinois 1965, page 2612, § 1 ILLnnois Rsv. STAT., c.
24, Section 11-31-2).
94 TENANTs' RiGHTS at 27.
95 Id. at 30-40.
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For the present, the Edwards case is an important forward step
in making codes effective through protecting the rights of citizens
to make code complaints 6 But, the Edwards case is but a small
step in making codes effective.
The decision has not lessened the need for legislation. Edwards
gave the tenant the right to assert a defense, but unless the defense
can be a certain means of deterring eviction, landlords will continue
to use this method of ridding their units of complaining tenants and
thereby discouraging future complaints. Legislation could establish
a presumption that the eviction was retaliatory if it occurred within
a specified period of time following the tenant's complaint.
Before examining current congressional proposals, it may be
well to examine the legislative efforts of those states which have
attempted to cope with the problem. New York State's Spiegel
Law enacted in 1962 allows public welfare officials to withhold
rent where tenants who receive welfare live in housing conditions
which are dangerous or detrimental to health. 7 The 1965 amend-
ment to the law was intended in part to stop retaliatory evictions
and provide for a stay of eviction until code violations are
remedied."8 Yet the Spiegel Law only applies to welfare recipients,
and, even though limited, has received criticism because it denies
rent revenue to the small landlord at the very time he most needs
it to correct code violations. 99
Massachusetts and Connecticut have enacted similar statutes
which allow the courts to stay eviction for a period up to nine
months. 00 In Massachusetts the tenant must not be a wrongdoer,
he must have searched diligently for similar housing in the same
city, and he must comply with terms which the court imposes.101
The major difficulty with the Massachusetts statute along with a
similar statute in Philadelphia is that once the violations of the
codes are remedied retaliatory eviction may occur.'0 )2
96 3 LAW iN ACTON 1 (June 1968).
97 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, c. 997. Note, Retaliatory Evcition-Is California
Lagging Behind?, 18 HASMTGS L.J. 700, 704 (1967).
98 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, c. 997, effective July 1, 1962, as amended by
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, c. 701, effective July 2, 1965.
99 Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New
York's Spiegel Law, 15 Btrnio L. REv. 572, 584-85 (1966).
100 MAss. GEN. LAws ANx. c. 239 §§ 9-13 (1959); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§§ 52-546 (Supp. 1964).
101 MASS. GEa. LAws ANN. C. 239 §§ 9-13 (1959).
102 TEKANTS'RIGHTs at 15.
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In Illinois, in New Jersey, and in Maryland, specific statutes
have been aimed at retaliatory eviction.10 3 Both the New Jersey
and Maryland statutes are too recent to assess in terms of their
effect, but the Illinois statute which is similar has not been effective
because it is difficult to prove that the reason for the eviction was
retaliation. 104
Most legislative efforts have failed to prohibit eviction through
rent increases even though this is clearly as effective a device as
direct eviction action.10 An amendment to the Baltimore statute
which would have made rent increases unlawful where the court
had determined that there was a defense to eviction based upon
unlawful conditions was proposed and then defeated. 106
Two current congressional attempts to cope with the problem of
retaliatory eviction are H.R. 257 and S. 3199.107 Both bills appear
to be more comprehensive than any similar existing legislation.
Title II of H.R. 257 deals with both retaliatory evictions and rent
increases. When a tenant files a complaint with the District of
Columbia Department of Licenses and Inspections, or when the
Department serves a notice of deficiencies to the landlord, or when
the tenant complains to the landlord, the landlord is then prevented
from evicting the tenant for a period of nine months. 0 8 The nine
month provision is thus incorporated into the statute even though
it is uncertain why protection could not be extended beyond that
time period if the tenant had good reasons to believe that retaliation
was the purpose of eviction. While the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals previously indicated its belief that the courts should
not examine the landlord-tenant relationship to determine such
retaliatory motives,109 Judge Wright's opinion clearly has given
the courts that new role.1 0 A danger to the new judicial attitude
as represented by Edwards v. Habib is that a legislatively imposed
time limit will be read as setting a maximum period of time during
which the tenant may be protected from retaliatory intent. To
103 18 HAsTINGs L.J. 700, 704; CLEARING HOUSE REVIEW 14, March, 1968;
3 LAW iN ACTION 12 (June 1968).
104 18 HASTINGS L. J. at 704.
105 Id.
106 3 LAW iN ACTION 12 (June 1968).
107 H. R. Doc. No. 257, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. was introduced by Repre-
sentative Bennett on January 10, 1967 and was referred to the Com-
mittee on the District of Columbia; S. Doc. No. 3199, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. was introduced by Senator Bible and was referred to the
Committee on the District of Columbia.
108 However, the Bill sets out nine rather broad exceptions to this rule.
109 Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388, 390 (1967).
110 397 F.2d at 702, 703.
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avoid any such construction, legislation should be explicit in either
permitting the courts to extend the time period, permitting the
courts to regard the time period as a minimum time during which
the tenant is protected, or simply doing away with the arbitrary
time period altogether. The latter suggestion would be the least
desirable since a legislatively imposed time period during which
the landlord could not evict concurrent with judicial efforts to
prohibit retaliatory eviction is at least a potentially more certain
and more explicit protection for the tenant than judicial protection
alone.
The purpose of S. 3199 as expressed in the bill is: "To pro-
hibit landlords from retaliating against tenants for good-faith
complaints of housing violations in the District of Columbia.""'
The bill establishes under section 1236B(c) a presumption that
where there has been a complaint to the District of Columbia and
there is a subsequent attempt at eviction or an attempt to increase
rent, such attempts will be presumed to be in retaliation for the
complaint and will be prohibited.
The presumption may be a more valuable protection for the
tenant than the formula laid down in H.R. 257 which prohibits an
action of eviction after a complaint except that the landlord may
recover possession if any one of nine exceptions is met. The first
exception is sufficient to indicate that in practice the nine month
prohibition on eviction actions could be easily skirted." 2
THE RESPONSE OF THE COURTS TO
RETALIATORY EVICTIONS
Even in the absence of additional legislation, important steps
could be taken in the District of Columbia to insure that the
Edwards defense to retaliatory eviction could be strengthened and
other legal defenses to retaliatory eviction developed." 3
M1 S. 3199, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
112 The first exception would allow the landlord to recover possession of
the premises if the tenant was violating a pre-existing obligation of
his tenancy. It is not difficult to foresee that in the presently existing
landlord's market, the landlord may be able to force a tenant into
a lease which places impossible burdens upon the tenant which
would be unenforced unless the tenant sought to complain. In addi-
tion the tenants' duty to pay rent on a given date might be considered
such a pre-existing duty despite the fact that indigent tenants fre-
quently pay rents shortly after the due dates. Comment, Landlord-
Tenant-Eviction in Retaliation for Reporting Housing Code Viola-
tions Prohibited, 44 No=s DAME LAWYER 286, 292 (1968).
113 A very simple change in housing codes would make the complainants
anonymous. At the present time landlords can usually find out whether
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a housing violation was discovered through a complaint or through
a search, and they can often discover the identity of the complaining
tenant. There is no sound reason why a landlord should be informed
of a complaint before it has been verified by housing inspectors. After
it has been verified, there is no reason to notify the landlord whether
the violation was first detected through inspection or by a tenant
complaint and then inspection. Of course where the complaint was
issued about conditions in a living unit and not the common area, a
landlord would know who the complainant was. On the other hand
a complaint from one unit might mean that other units in the same
building were in comparable condition and there would be no need
for the inspectors to limit themselves to inspecting just one unit.
Inspecting an entire building on the strength of one complaint would
be entirely reasonable in a jurisdiction which depended primarily
upon complaints for information of code violations. Naturally the
inspection of the entire building would insure a greater anonymity
for the complainant and encourage tenants to notify without fear of
retaliatory gestures. LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR at 296, 297.
While anonymity would encourage the flow of information to the
inspection agencies, as a practical matter a landlord can often dis-
cover from other tenants or his supervisor in the building who the
complainant was. If tenants were organized in a tenant union, how-
ever, complaints could be issued through the union itself and indi-
viduals would thereby be shielded. The union would of course have
other benefits for the tenant-among them the enforcement of code
provisions through the use of private economic sanctions. Limited
experience with these unions indicates some success in enforcement
of housing codes through utilization of existing legal sanctions and
private economic pressures. Retaliation through massive eviction of
unionized tenants would be difficult even where housing is in ex-
tremely short supply because the tenants would be able to delay evic-
tion while they asserted retaliation as a defense to the eviction pro-
ceedings. Such a delay would enable tenants to locate other housing in
the event their defense was unsuccessful. The landlord could look for-
ward to extended and expensive legal proceedings along with a pos-
sible frustration of his ultimate purpose. Even if he were successful
his eviction would result in vacancies and loss of rental values for
an indeterminate period.
All of these legal devices for the tenant are limited by the sheer
unavailability of legal help for the poor. To be sure, this need has been
partially met, but the current strains on legal services in poverty
areas are enormous and many cases simply cannot be handled by
the relatively small numbers of lawyers currently devoting themselves
to this work. While retaliatory eviction cases may now receive some
priority, their defense may well be at the expense of other potential
indigent litigants who will not receive a share of the limited legal
services currently available. In determining which cases can be
handled distinctions will probably have to be drawn between clear-
cut cases such as Mrs. Edwards, where an eviction or rent increase
follows closely on the heels of a complaint, and cases where the
retaliatory measures are taken some time after the complaint and
inspection and are more difficult to prove. See generally PROCEmINGS
OF =rn E-IlvARD CONFRENCE Ow LAW AND PovERTY, March 17, 18 and
19, 1967.
COMMENTS
After Edwards the tenant will still have difficulty in proving
in court that a retaliatory eviction has taken place. Judge Wright's
opinion tacitly admits that a landlord, in the absence of legislation,
may be able to retaliate by giving a purely economic reason or
through giving no reason at all." 4 Indeed the economic reason may
have credence if the landlord asserts that he has been forced to
bring his units up to code standards and that his operating costs
have dramatically increased.
An important consideration in the wake of Edwards will be the
burden of proof necessary to establish the new defense of retaliation.
There will be difficulty in seeking to prove the illegal purpose of
retaliation. The question will be one of permissible or impermissible
purpose, and this will be a question of fact for the court or the
jury.1" 5 The court or jury will have to demand that the tenant made
a good faith complaint to the housing inspectors. Following this
complaint, there would have to be alleged the initiation of eviction
procedures or a demand for an increase in rent. Whether these were
retaliatory gestures would depend in part upon how closely they
followed upon the tenant's complaint. In order to prevent recurring
suits and at the same time allow the landlord a later opportunity
to repossess his tenancy, the courts may be forced to establish
a presumption that once an eviction has been judged retaliatory,
subsequent evictions during a specified period of time would also
be presumed retaliatory.1 6
The precise standards of proof were not discussed by Judge
Wright in his opinion but it was stated that the questions pre-
sented by the Edwards case were not "significantly different from
problems with which the courts must deal in a host of other
contexts, such as when they must decide whether the employer
who discharges a worker has committed an unfair labor practice
because he has done so on account of the employee's union activi-
ties." "7 As Judge Greene had written in his lower court memo-
randum opinion, the distinction between action which is permitted
when done for a lawful purpose but proscribed when done for an
illegal purpose can be made and is made daily by court and
administrative agencies without interfering in legitimate eco-
nomic interests."
8
114 397 F.2d at 702.
"5 Id.
116 See generally Judge Greene's opinion in HousiNG FOR THE POOR at 45-
46.
"7 397 F.2d at 702-03.
.18 HousiNG FOR THE POOR at 46.
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In addition to asserting retaliation as a defense to an eviction
action, a tenant could also seek to enjoin an eviction because
of its retaliatory purpose.119 After a tenant has filed a housing
complaint and has reason to believe the landlord will seek to
evict him, the tenant may seek an injunction which could be
phrased in terms of the landlord's retaliatory motive. 1' ° Such an
injunction could be sought for an indefinite time period since a
landlord might be tempted to evict immediately after the injunction
has expired. 21 It is doubtful, however, whether eviction can be
long delayed through an injunction. Courts may be reluctant to
interfere in a month-to-month tenancy, and, in effect, transform
it into a contract where a tenant has rights to retain possession of
the tenancy for an indefinite period. An injunction could probably
best be sought after the landlord has disclosed retaliatory purpose
through a notice of intent to evict or through a major (and unjusti-
fied) increase in rent. In light of the Edwards decision courts may
be more willing to grant an injunction where: (1) the landlord
is apparently operating premises illegally in violation of the housing
code; and (2) where the landlord displays a retaliatory purpose
which the Edwards case has declared illegal.
Yet the reluctance of courts to utilize the injunction to assist
the tenant where the tenant has no real contractual right is clearly
illustrated by the Edwards case. At the same time that Mrs.
Edwards was seeking in the Landlord-Tenant Branch to establish
retaliatory eviction as a defense, she filed Civil Action 2570-65 in
the District Court on October 14, 1965.122 In that action Mrs.
Edwards sought: (1) an interlocutory injunction; (2) a permanent
injunction; (3) a temporary restraining order; (4) $5,000 compensa-
tory damages; and (5) $20,000 punitive damages. Mrs. Edwards
argued that it was against public policy and the intent of the regula-
tions to permit defendant to evict because of complaints to the
Housing Division.'2 The injunction was denied because there was
an adequate remedy at law (damages which Mrs. Edwards alleged)
and because the test for preliminary injunction as established by
the Circuit Court in Embassy Dairy v. Camalier had not been met.1'
Whether Mrs. Edwards' quest for an injunction would have met
with judicial approval after the defense of retaliatory eviction had
been recognized in the jurisdiction either by case law or by statute
is a moot question.
1"9 Schoshinski at 545.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628, 631 (1965).
= Id.
COMMENTS
CONCLUSION
The decision in Edwards v. Habib is but a partial answer to the
critical need for providing housing for the poor. To the degree
that citizen complaints will be encouraged and codes better en-
forced, some improvement in housing conditions may be expected.
Even if heretofore unsuccessful code enforcement can be somewhat
improved, the tenant still faces a persistent housing shortage, a
possibility of future retaliatory action, and a continued weak bar-
gaining position with his landlord.
Judge Wright has written, subsequent to his decision in Edwards,
that:
Though our most pressing social, moral and political imperative
is to liberate the urban poor from their degradation, the courts
continue to apply ancient legal doctrines which merely compound
the plight of the poverty-stricken. These doctrines may once have
served a purpose, but their time has passed. They must be modified
or abandoned.125
What is important in Edwards is not only its departure from
common law landlord-tenant law by its upholding of the defense
of retaliation, but its generalized conclusion that the law and public
policy as discerned and applied by the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia favors the interests of the tenant rather than
the landlord. Courts in other jurisdictions may have more difficulty
coming to this conclusion both because of their own statutes and
their reluctance to change from the older doctrines. Yet while other
jurisdictions do not have the same statutory history and structure
as the District of Columbia, the constitutional issues which Judge
Wright discussed in the course of his opinion seem to support a
more universally expanded view of tenants' rights. While urging
these constitutional rights will not bring immediate change in
housing conditions, increased judicial recognition and acceptance
of these rights would prove to be an important step in "modifying"
or "abandoning" a system of landlord-oriented law which stands
in the way of improving the conditions of the low-income tenant.
Neil B. Danberg '70
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125 Wright, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1969 (Magazine) at 116. In this regard it
may be well to note that tenants in federally assisted housing proj-
ects may no longer be summarily evicted without prior notification of
the reasons for their eviction and without opportunity to reply to
those reasons. Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, .393
U.S. 268 (1969). -
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